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Introduction 
 
 
Non-Jewish Minorities and Their Access 
to Israeli Citizenship 
Demographic Threat Perceptions and Ensuing State Strategies 
Lidia Averbukh 
On Independence Day in May 2016, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics announced 
that the Israeli population had increased tenfold since the State’s establishment in 
1948. Leading national newspapers rejoiced that the population has multiplied from 
an initial 800,000 to almost 8.5 million, a figure ascribable to the highest birth rate in 
the western world among other facts, such as Jewish immigration. This, in turn, can 
be attributed to the fact that the state seeks to preserve and promote the country’s 
Jewish majority. The downside of this policy is the discrimination of minorities living 
in Israel, which are deemed a demographic threat. This applies not only to Arab Israelis, 
but also to the growing number of foreign workers who replace labour forces from 
the Palestinian territories, and to African refugees whose legal integration within the 
Israeli citizenship system is not foreseen. Less exclusive access to citizenship and the 
secure legal status of non-Jewish population groups is likely only to be possible if they 
are no longer viewed as a threat. 
 
The Basic Laws passed in the 1990s define 
Israel as a state which is both Jewish and 
democratic. A similar concept is already 
mentioned in the Declaration of Independ-
ence of 1948. The mandate to reconcile 
“Jewish” and “democratic” is often inter-
preted as follows: as long as Israel demon-
strates a clearly Jewish majority, the two 
state precepts do not conflict with one an-
other. In this understanding, the majority 
of Jewish votes guarantee democratic pro-
cedures in a Jewish state, although this con-
cept of democracy is lacking in substance. 
This stance is in line with the position 
adopted by members of the current govern-
ment, such as the Zionist-nationalist party 
Likud, as well as the party Yisrael Beiteinu, 
with its base of secular, Russian-speaking 
Israelis. A Jewish majority constitutes an 
expression of state Jewish identity also for 
the rest of Jewish and Zionist parties, such 
as the socially conservative coalition party 
Kulanu, led by Finance Minister Kahlon 
and the opposition parties Yesh Atid, by 
Yair Lapid, the central left party Zionist 
Union and the leftist Meretz. Both of the 
latter parties also make a greater emphasis 
on the democratic values. 
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However, democracy is of little signifi-
cance to the religious coalition parties 
which are exerting an ever stronger influ-
ence on Israeli politics. They believe that 
the identity of the Jewish State is based on 
Jewish religious law (halakha). This advo-
cates high birth rates and prevents assimi-
lation through marriages with non-Jews, 
which could sever the Jewish lineage. The 
current coalition parties United Torah 
Judaism and Shas endorse a religious demo-
graphic policy. The nationalist-religious 
party The Jewish Home, led by Naftali 
Bennett, which also holds seats in the 
Knesset, unites a Zionist-nationalist with 
a religious stance. 
The collaboration of the Zionist and 
religious camps within a government which 
can be traced back to the era prior to the 
State’s establishment proved a decisive 
factor in the increased population growth 
within Jewish Israel, as the Zionist and 
religious interests tally in questions of 
demographics. As a result, it is hardly sur-
prising that the legal instrument used to 
create and preserve the Jewish majority, 
namely Israeli citizenship, has been inter-
preted as the inclusion of Jews and the 
exclusion of all other individuals since 
the State’s foundation. 
Like other Israeli legislation, the immi-
gration and naturalisation laws allow for 
a broad range of interpretation, enabling 
common ground to be found among all 
the political interest groups and ensuring 
a relatively large margin of discretion as far 
as implementation of the law is concerned. 
It follows that the ideological persuasion of 
the respective Minister of the Interior is of 
decisive importance for the interpretation 
and execution of the immigration and natu-
ralisation laws, i.e. whether he belongs to 
the secular or religious camp. 
Legal implementation practices within 
a legislative system can thus vary in such a 
way that Arab citizens of Israel are treated 
differently to Jewish citizens. If migrants 
can be categorised neither as Jewish nor 
Palestinian, such as foreign workers and 
refugees, then the latitude in terms of laws 
and directives can be used systematically 
in order to prevent the long-term settlement 
of non-Jewish immigrants and to refuse 
legal rights. All parties who have provided 
a Minister of the Interior to date have pur-
sued the policy of expediting Jewish immi-
gration as far as possible, and minimising 
the settlement and integration of non-
Jewish groups. 
Demographic background 
A Jewish population majority arose in the 
course of the establishment of the State 
of Israel and had to be preserved to secure 
the State’s future existence. The founding 
fathers consequently established a system 
which sought simultaneously to accelerate 
Jewish immigration and naturalisation 
and to restrict the access of Palestinians to 
Israeli citizenship. 
During the almost 70 years of the State’s 
existence, the number of Jewish immigrants 
has plateaued at a constant, but low aver-
age of 20,000–25,000 each year, only slightly 
exceeding the number of emigrants. As the 
pool of potential new immigrants is virtu-
ally exhausted, non-Jewish groups in Israel 
are regarded increasingly as a threat. This 
can be ascribed to a series of historical, 
social and political factors. 
The birth rates of Arab Israelis are deemed 
a key threat to a Jewish majority. In the 
political world, this development is referred 
to as a danger, which could eventually 
make the Jewish nature of the Israeli State 
obsolete as a result of the preponderance 
of Arabs. Today, 20.8 per cent of the Israeli 
population is Arab. According to statistics 
published in 2014, an average of 3.11 chil-
dren are born to Jewish families, and 3.17 
children to Arab families. 
Although the birth rate among Arab 
Israelis, which has been in decline since 
2002, indicates that the “demographic war” 
waged within the country has been won, 
namely in favour of Jewish Israelis, whose 
birth rate continues to rise rapidly, such 
facts are by no means sufficient reason for 
Israeli politicians to refrain from employing 
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the “demographic threat” in order to mobi-
lise other swathes of the population. 
Both Israeli and Palestinian parties prom-
ulgate a high birth rate as a type of patri-
otic duty. In Israel, elections have always 
been successfully won by instrumentalising 
fears regarding Palestinians, both those 
living in the country itself and as far as 
potential Arab supremacy in the region is 
concerned. The former Palestinian leader 
Yasser Arafat also referred to “the womb of 
the Arab woman (as the) strongest weapon” 
against Israel. Simultaneously, references 
to the ecological and economic dangers of 
Israel’s potential future overpopulation are 
rare, particularly as regards Jewish Israelis. 
The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics antici-
pates that the population will have swelled 
to between 15 and 20 million by 2059. 
The absence of social debate on this issue 
can be partially explained by the experience 
of the Holocaust, in the course of which 
the Jewish people’s fears of extinction were 
perceptibly substantiated. This fear triggered 
individual and social traumas which con-
tinue to have an impact today. The Holocaust 
casts its shadow on each crisis in which 
Israel feels that its very existence is under 
threat. This applies to the missile attacks 
from the Gaza strip just as much as to Iran’s 
negation of Israel’s right of existence. 
The social response to these perceived 
threats is made manifest, inter alia, in in-
creasing birth rates. Nine months after the 
Israel—Gaza conflict in the summer of 
2014, for instance, a baby boom within the 
Jewish population was noted. The need to 
compensate past losses with a high num-
ber of children, this at least symbolically, 
and thus protect oneself against possible 
future losses, is reinforced by the Jewish 
religious precept of reproduction. More-
over, the Israeli healthcare system offers a 
variety of methods of artificial insemina-
tion. 
The religious ban on assimilation also 
finds expression in the Israeli legal system 
as far as demographic aspects are concerned. 
Family law, which is wholly religiously in-
fluenced, allows for no intermarriages, as 
no civil marriages are recognised. Further-
more, the citizenship system impedes 
family reunions between non-Jewish part-
ners and the longer-term settlement of 
individuals who could challenge the Jewish 
character of the State of Israel. 
Citizenship of Jewish and 
Arab Israelis 
The Nationality Law of 1952 determines 
who is, or may become, an Israeli citizen. 
In the first instance, Jews from the diaspora 
making use of the Law of Return; in the 
second, individuals who were subjects of 
the former British Mandate at the time of 
the State’s establishment and who did not 
flee or were expelled in 1948, and, in the 
third, children of an Israeli national. In 
addition, non-Jewish individuals may be 
naturalised in certain circumstances. 
The so-called Law of Return was adopted 
in 1950 and extended in 1970. It permits all 
individuals able to trace their Jewish ances-
try back to a Jewish grandparent to immi-
grate to Israel, a regulation which includes 
their spouses. The Law of Return constitutes 
the only form of statutory immigration to 
Israel. It places no restrictions on immigra-
tion in terms of age or qualifications. The 
decisive criterion is an affiliation to the 
Jewish people. In its level of significance, 
the law is equated most closely to that of 
a Constitution, and remains unchallenged 
by any Jewish political party. The Israeli 
government organises and expedites Jewish 
immigration to Israel with the aid of a broad 
network of international offices operating 
on behalf of relevant organisations, includ-
ing the Jewish Agency for Israel and Nefesh 
B’Nefesh. 
The Law of Return continues to consti-
tute a form of reassurance for many Jews, 
which can be “redeemed” as necessary. 
Unsurprisingly, almost 50 per cent of the 
latest Jewish immigrants, who entered be-
tween spring 2015 and spring 2016, came 
from crisis-ridden Ukraine and from France, 
where anti-Semitism and jihadi attacks are 
on the rise. 
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The group of individuals living in the 
British Mandate for Palestine prior to 
the State’s establishment, and who were 
ineligible to avail themselves of the Law 
of Return includes the relations of all Arab 
population groups and a small number 
of religious and ethnic minorities. These 
individuals may only be naturalised if they 
have been living legally on Israeli territory 
since the State’s proclamation or entered 
Israel legally until this law’s enforcement 
in 1952. With this, the legal category of 
the remaining “Arab Israelis” was created, 
and excluded Palestinians who fled or were 
expelled during the 1948 War of Independ-
ence. 
Two further laws, the “Entry into Israel 
Law” of 1952 and the “Prevention of Infil-
tration Law” of 1954, stipulate that the 
return of Palestinians and immigration 
from enemy states is to be deemed “infiltra-
tion” and that prosecution may occur as 
a result. Palestinian return is the ultimate 
disaster for Israel, and would ultimately 
lead to the end of the Jewish state. The 
restrictive naturalisation policies of the 
majority of neighbouring states, where 
Palestinians settled since their flight and 
expulsion, prevent them from being 
accepted into a new state collective body, 
in which they could integrate themselves. 
As a result of their statelessness, their iden-
tity remains firmly tied to the historical 
territory of Palestine. 
Palestinian refugees do not fall within 
the remit of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but are, 
instead, the responsibility of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
According to the Israeli interpretation, they 
therefore fail to fall within the scope of the 
internationally recognised definition of 
refugees, and have no right to asylum in 
Israel in consequence. At the same time, 
neighbouring states consolidate the Pales-
tinian refugee problem as regards accusa-
tions towards Israel. The refugees remain 
in a legal vacuum – with no prospect of a 
naturalised status in the host countries, 
and little hope of enjoying an individual 
future citizenship. 
Israeli citizenship can also be trans-
mitted in accordance with the principle 
of birthright. Israelis abroad can pass on 
their citizenship to the next generation, 
although this right expires in the second 
generation. This marks a fundamental dif-
ference between Jewish and non-Jewish 
Israelis, as the Law of Return permits Jewish 
emigrants to return to Israel for at least a 
generation longer than their compatriots. 
By contrast, all non-Jewish Israeli emigrants 
lose Israeli citizenship and the right to 
return in the second generation. 
The status of Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem is a special case. Although these 
individuals do not hold Israeli citizenship 
like Arab Israelis, they do have a permanent 
Israeli residence permit, unlike Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and on the Gaza 
Strip. This is not automatically inherited, 
and may be revoked in the event of a pro-
longed stay abroad. 
Finally, the right to family reunions and 
the naturalisation of non-Israeli partners is 
enshrined in the Nationality Law. However, 
the “Entry into Israel Law” was extended in 
2003. Since then, spouses of Israeli citizens 
have no longer been permitted to immigrate 
to Israel and may not obtain Israeli citizen-
ship if they come from Gaza or the West 
Bank. Conceived as a temporary safeguard-
ing measure, the extended version of the 
law continues to apply today, and has far-
reaching consequences for Palestinian fami-
lies who are frequently connected across 
borders. Since its modification, the law has 
been the focus of public criticism, chiefly 
from the left-wing parties, and numerous 
human rights organisations. The imple-
mentation of the legal provisions related 
to naturalisation is also problematic. Al-
though they permit the de jure naturalisa-
tion of all immigrants if they fulfil criteria 
including language skills and duration of 
stay, the few individuals who have actually 
been naturalised in accordance with these 
regulations are predominantly spouses of 
Jewish Israelis. 
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Deep-seated fears of external “infiltra-
tion” and the rise of the Arab population 
within the country constitute chief motives 
for the restrictive immigration and natu-
ralisation policies towards Palestinians. 
The legally constructed pair of opposites of 
“Jewish Israelis/Arab Israelis” pervades the 
entire citizenship system. One could even 
describe it as two discrete nationalities 
within a single legal framework. 
Other forms of immigration 
The Israeli citizenship system does not 
provide for the systematic settlement of 
non-Jewish immigrants. As a result, no 
organised procedure regulating how these 
individuals can obtain a controlled, per-
manent status within Israeli society exists. 
A few years ago, the relatively new phenom-
enon of a high influx of non-Jewish immi-
grants and those wishing to settle triggered 
a public debate on ways in which the citi-
zenship system could be reformed. To date, 
however, its legal shortcomings and contra-
dictions have not been resolved. Instead, 
it has been used systematically in order to 
ensure that non-Jewish minorities within 
the State are kept to a minimum, and to pre-
vent legal claims from such groups gaining 
ground. As far as the stance on the situa-
tion of non-Jewish minorities is concerned, 
two camps can be identified. On the one 
hand, there is the party Meretz, individual 
party members of the Zionist Union and 
countless human rights organisations and 
NGOs, and, on the other, the religious and 
Zionist-nationalist parties which currently 
make up the government. 
Migrant workers 
Israel has been home to a large minority 
of non-Jewish migrant workers since the 
1990s. These are illegal immigrants who 
enter Israel on tourist visas and look for 
work, foreign workers hired in the Far 
East who hold temporary work visas, and, 
finally, those who remain illegally in Israel 
after their work visas expire. According to 
data published by the Israel Central Bureau 
of Statistics, around 91,000 registered and 
approximately 101,000 illegal migrant work-
ers were living in Israel in 2014. 
Some illegal migrants have now been 
living in Israel for over two decades, and 
many of these have children born in the 
country. As they are ineligible for any state 
social security benefits as a result of their 
illegal residence, local network structures 
have been created which secure a minimum 
social standard. The government categori-
cally declares that all migrant workers are 
only residing in Israel on a short-term basis. 
As a result, no state-run programmes exist, 
with the aid of which this group of individ-
uals could be integrated into society and 
receive a permanent legal status. With this, 
Israel has created for itself a catch-22 situa-
tion, similar to other countries which rely 
on labour migration: on the one hand, an 
economic necessity exists which requires 
foreign workers to enter the country, yet, 
on the other, the political willingness to 
grant such individuals a share in both state 
and society is lacking. 
Furthermore, migrant workers live sepa-
rated from the Jewish population, which 
prevents even the slightest degree of inte-
gration or assimilation. This separation is 
induced, among other things, by legal grey 
areas. No coherent regulations exist, for in-
stance, on whether conversions to Judaism 
performed within Israel are recognised by 
the Law of Return and can, in consequence, 
be used in order to obtain Israeli citizen-
ship. In practice, attempts to become natu-
ralised in this manner have been prevented 
either by the Supreme Court (2005) or by 
religious stakeholders. The religiously-moti-
vated refusal to grant these non-Jewish im-
migrants full rights is also corroborated by 
common parlance. The official Hebrew des-
ignation for foreign work (“avoda zara”) cor-
responds to the religious term for “idolatry”. 
It is conceivable that the problems stem-
ming from this legal situation will inten-
sify as a result of the fact that the need for 
migrant workers is likely to increase. In 
addition, many Palestinians from the West 
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Bank who once worked in Israel have had 
their entry and work permits revoked since 
the commencement of knife attacks – the 
so called lone-wolf-Intifada – on Israelis. As 
was the case during previous escalations 
of the conflict, an increased recruitment of 
workers from the Far East could ensue. Yet 
in contrast to the Palestinian workers who 
return to the West Bank each evening, many 
of the new migrant workers are likely to 
attempt to stay on a long-term basis. 
A correlation between the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict and labour migration can 
be determined in consequence. For Pales-
tinians, the conflict has resulted in their 
access to Israel becoming increasingly 
restricted, thus endangering their econom-
ic livelihoods. In Israel, however, labour 
migration and the subsequent constant 
presence of non-Jews are viewed as a threat 
to the State’s Jewish nature. This dynamic 
is aggravating the situation of Palestinian 
workers, and simultaneously subverting 
Israel’s sense of identity. 
Refugees 
As far as the treatment of refugees is con-
cerned, it should also be noted that the 
rethoric of the current government system-
atically questions the legitimacy of their 
residence, and strives to stigmatise them 
as “economic migrants” and “infiltrators”. 
According to this logic, the State’s Jewish 
identity, which is linked to a Jewish major-
ity, conflicts with the right to asylum. 
Israel signed the Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, and thus 
committed itself to accepting international 
standards related to refugees and granting 
these individuals the right to asylum. Like 
many other countries, however, Israel con-
siders itself confronted by a disproportionate 
number of refugees, and believes it is ob-
liged to bear an overly heavy load in this 
respect. Yet the 45,000 refugees constitute 
a mere 0.5 per cent of the country’s total 
population of 8.5 million. Since 2006, Israel 
has become the destination of choice for 
refugees from Sudan and Eritrea, in particu-
lar. This is because Israel is the only country 
in relative proximity theoretically obliged 
to guarantee them minimal legal standards. 
These refugees are the poorest of the poor, 
who lack both the networks and funds re-
quired to risk the journey to Europe. 
In order to satisfy the very general de-
mands of the Geneva Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees and, simultane-
ously, to apply the law of asylum restric-
tively in the national interest, the Israeli 
government performs a legal balancing act. 
Although the UNHCR monitors the overall 
refugee situation and provides assistance 
with asylum applications, the final decision 
on each application has been made by the 
Israeli Ministry of Interior since 2009. Be-
tween 2013 and 2015, Israel granted asylum 
to just 45 applicants. This can be explained 
by the fact that numerous refugees have 
been denied refugee status and, with this, 
the right to apply for asylum. 
Sudanese refugees, for instance, are un-
able to apply for asylum as a rule, as they 
are deemed to come from an enemy state 
in accordance with the latest version of the 
“Prevention of Infiltration Law” of 2012. 
This law also holds that refugees who enter 
the country on foot via the Egyptian-Israeli 
border fall into the category of “infiltra-
tors”. However, deporting these individuals 
back to Egypt is considered politically in-
defensible since the revolution, and would 
result in protests by the opposition and 
countless human rights organisations. As 
a result, these refugees are interned indis-
criminately in a series of detention camps 
set up near the border. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
An analysis of the Israeli citizenship sys-
tem reveals how access to citizenship is 
determined not individually, but rather in 
accordance with group affiliation within 
legal framework. 
The existence of a Jewish majority less-
ens the Jewish people’s fears of extinction 
and legitimises Israel’s self-identification 
as a Jewish State. The resulting demo-
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graphic policy, meanwhile, consolidates the 
exclusively Jewish claim to the territory 
and excludes Palestinians and Arab Israelis 
by depriving them of rights or refusing to 
concede them said rights initially. 
The inadequate official regulation of 
non-Jewish groups such as migrant workers 
and refugees carries the risk of social ten-
sion. In the light of the increasing levels 
of xenophobia within the population, the 
need for political discourse on this subject 
is becoming ever more urgent. The longer 
the country fails to deal with these immi-
grants, depriving them of a secure legal 
status within the citizenship system, the 
greater the probable sense within the Israeli 
population of being left to deal with the 
problem of an undesirable minority. 
The fact that xenophobic populism in 
Israel is falling on fertile soil is borne out by 
the growing number of citizens’ initiatives 
and regular demonstrations against non-
Jewish immigrants. In this respect, the social 
response to government immigration and 
naturalisation policies in Israel bears a re-
semblance to similar reactions in numerous 
European countries. The inadequate inte-
gration of migrant workers and the piece-
meal legal status of refugees are issues 
which have long been a thorn in the side 
of Europe. 
However, the Israeli government chooses 
not to curb or check the xenophobic tenden-
cies. On the contrary, the current govern-
ment is not immune to populism, with the 
result that there is no appreciable differ-
ence between its treatment of Palestinians 
and non-Jewish migrants and the stance 
taken by the population. Yet, above all, 
the Israeli government remains resolutely 
silent as it regards the fact that the prob-
lems described above are, not least, a result 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The Jewish-Israeli insecurity as far as the 
future demographic constellation is con-
cerned is derived from several sources. On 
the one hand, the governing parties lack 
the political will to explicitly emphasise 
the reality of a largely predominant Jewish 
majority within the heartland to their own 
voters, and to renounce the allusions to a 
demographic threat by the birth rates of 
Arab Israelis. On the other, demographic 
prognoses confined to the Israeli heartland 
are of limited informational value in the 
face of the ongoing occupation of the West 
Bank. The continuation of this unsatisfactory 
status quo and the scenario of a one-state 
solution which could develop both increase 
insecurity in the region. In the absence of a 
clear definition of the future national popu-
lation, a proper debate on the subject of an 
alleged demographic threat is just as unlike-
ly as a reform of Israel’s citizenship laws. 
As a result, the two-state solution prob-
ably remains the most realistic way of sta-
bilising Israel’s identity as a Jewish, demo-
cratic state and securing it in the long term. 
However, which stakeholders in Israel’s 
current party landscape would, generally 
speaking, be in a position to shatter the 
status quo and, simultaneously, make suit-
able partners for Europe and Germany? 
At first glance, collaborations by Euro-
pean governments with the current oppo-
sition parties the Zionist Union and Meretz 
appear most plausible. Located on the left 
of the Israeli political spectrum, these par-
ties believe that there is more to the “demo-
cratic” principle of state than a mere right 
to vote. As a result, they correspond most 
closely to the European idea of Israel as the 
sole democracy in the Middle East. They 
endeavour to secure the rights of non-
Jewish inhabitants, who represent around 
20 per cent of the total population. In a 
country in which religion is steadily gain-
ing ground, they are unable to command 
majority backing, and are unable to offer 
even their core voters a convincingly liberal, 
secular concept of “Jewishness”. 
Simultaneously, European cooperation 
with the left-wing political spectrum is eyed 
with suspicion in Israel, and criticised as a 
biased attempt to influence domestic policy 
processes. As a result, it meanwhile seems 
reasonable to consolidate the constructive 
dialogue with the Israeli parties capable of 
winning a majority, which, although located 
right of centre according to European and 
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German standards, are deemed “Centre-
right Parties” within Israel itself. Here, we 
are referring to the coalition parties Kulanu, 
Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, and, in the lat-
ter case, predominantly its pragmatic wing. 
In contrast to religious right-wing parties, 
these groups are committed to democracy, 
and the majority of their members con-
tinue to adhere to the idea of a two-state 
solution, even if the border demarcation 
may not necessarily conform to the inter-
nationally recognised “Green Line” (armi-
stice line of 1949). However, these parties 
are the only ones which could count on the 
support of the populace in the event of a 
rapprochement with the Palestinians and 
reforms in the field of demographic policy. 
Furthermore, within the present govern-
ment, they constitute those stakeholders 
most suited to furthering the peace process 
and altering the legal status of minorities 
in the process. 
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